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Abstract : Over the past decade, the United States (US) and the European Union
(EU) have implemented widely divergent regulatory systems to govern the
production and consumption of genetically modiﬁed (GM) agricultural crops. In
the US, many GM varieties have been commercially produced and marketed,
while in the EU few varieties have been approved: a de facto moratorium limited
EU production, import and domestic sale of most GM crops from late 1998 to
April 2004, and since then strict labelling regulations and a slow approval process
are having a similar eﬀect. The EU policies have substantially altered trade ﬂows
and led in September 2003 to the WTO establishing a WTO Dispute Settlement
panel to test the legality of European policy towards imports of GM foods.
This paper seeks to better understand the economic forces behind the diﬀerent
regulatory approaches of the US and the EU. It uses a model of the global
economy (GTAP) to examine empirically how GM biotechnology adoption
would aﬀect the economic welfare of both adopting and non-adopting countries
in the absence of alternative policy responses to this technology, and in their
presence. These results go beyond earlier empirical studies to indicate eﬀects on
real incomes of farm households, and suggest the EU moratorium on GM imports
helps EU farmers even though it requires them to forego the productivity boost
they could receive from the new GM biotechnology.
New agricultural biotechnologies are being developed every day, including those
that involve genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs). Relative to conventional
crop varieties, GM crops promise substantial beneﬁts for farmers (greater pro-
ductivity, less occupational health and environmental damage from pesticides),
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and ultimately also for consumers (lower food prices, enhanced product
attributes). Also, because genetic engineering involves more-controlled manipu-
lation of genetic material, this technology can shave years oﬀ R&D programs
compared with conventional plant breeding, potentially oﬀering the world another
‘green revolution’.
So far the adoption of GM technology has been widespread only in the
production of maize, soybean, and canola, as well as in cotton. As of 2004, GM
varieties accounted for 29% of the area planted to those crops globally (and 5% of
all arable land), having been close to zero prior to 1996 (James, 2004). However,
almost all GM food is grown in just three countries : Argentina, Canada, and the
United States, where, because of production cost savings (>5%) and few regu-
latory impediments, the GM shares of those crops average more than 60% (James,
2004). In the European Union, by contrast, a de facto moratorium introduced in
1998 has ensured virtually no GM crop varieties have been approved for pro-
duction or sale in its member countries, ostensibly in response to strong opposition
by some consumer and other community groups concerned about their potentially
adverse impacts on food safety (e.g., ‘Will they cause cancer?’) and the environ-
ment (e.g., ‘Will they lead to pesticide-resistant superweeds?’).
These facts raise several important questions. Leaving aside GM cotton (which
has had immediate occupational health and environmental beneﬁts in addition to
cost savings for farmers, and raises no food safety concerns), why were these crops
the ﬁrst ones to be targeted by biotech ﬁrms? Why have those three American
countries but virtually no others adopted this new technology so far? What are
the implications for global food markets and economic welfare, including for the
poor in developing countries? And what impacts will they have on the rules-based
global trading system?
The answer to the ﬁrst question may be that technologically those three
crops were easiest to genetically modify and capture payment for the intellectual
property involved, but a more likely or at least supplementary reason has to do
with where those crops are grown and sold. The US alone accounts for 30–40%
of global production and consumption of maize and soybean, and in the past ﬁve
years the US, Canada, and Argentina have enjoyed a combined share of global
exports of 80% for maize, 64% for soybean (91% if Brazil is included),1 and 42%
for canola. By contrast, those countries account for less than one-sixth of global
wheat production and less than one-twentieth of global rice production (Anderson
and Jackson, 2005a: Tables 3 and 4.) That concentration meant regulatory
approval for soybean and maize in just three countries could potentially oﬀer
biotech ﬁrms access to the lion’s share of those products’ markets, as well as
1 Between 10% and 30% of Brazil’s soybean crop is estimated to be illegal GM varieties (USDA,
2003). At end-September 2003 the Brazilian President announced temporarily legalizing GM soybean
production and in 2004 that reform was made permanent.
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demonstrate to poorer countries that rich countries are willing to produce and
consume GM food.
Given that ﬁrst play in this game, the next two questions are: why have other
countries not yet followed the American adoption of GM food, and how is that
abstinence impacting on global welfare and in particular on the world’s poor? A
conventional (but contestable) answer to the ﬁrst is that Europeans and others care
more about the natural environment than do people in North or South America.
An additional part of the conventional wisdom is that Europeans have less trust in
their food safety regulators than do Americans. While not denying either of those
possibilities, we seek further possible explanations by asking how the adoption of
GM technology by the ﬁrst three adopting countries is impacting on the economic
interests of ﬁrst the European Union – particularly EU farmers – and then, given
the EU’s moratorium stance, on other countries.
Again some facts are illuminating. The trade impact of the EU’s 1998 mora-
torium was immediate and dramatic. The US share of EU maize imports fell from
around two-thirds in the mid-1990s to virtually zero, as has Canada’s share of EU
canola imports (from just over one-half in the mid-1990s). The GM-adopting
countries lost market share to GM-free suppliers, particularly Brazil for maize and
soybean and Australia and Central Europe in the case of canola (Table 1). This
strengthened fears that EU members or other food-importing countries would
discount or deny market access to products of food-exporting countries if any GM
crops are grown in or even imported into those exporting countries. An example is
China (representing almost one-ﬁfth of the world’s food economy), whose initial
reluctance to approve GM food production ostensibly was because it was denied
access to the EU market in 1999 for soy sauce that may have been produced using
GM soybeans from the US. This fear of losing EU market access was also the
ostensible reason Zambia and Zimbabwe did not want to accept US humanitarian
food aid in the form of GM maize in 2002–2003.
Uncertainty for food exporters increased further when the multilateral Biosafety
Protocol came into eﬀect on 11 September 2003. Already that Protocol has been
called on by the European Union to justify its moratorium on the approval of GM
imports.
In response to frustration over the way the EU precautionary measures have
been applied (e.g., some EU member states maintain national marketing and
import bans even on GM varieties that have been approved by the European
Commission), the United States, Canada, and Argentina sought the establishment
of a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel on 29 August 2003 to rule on the WTO
consistency of the measures. (At the time of writing, March 2005, the case was still
ongoing.) Subsequent GMO dispute cases are likely to focus on the scientiﬁc jus-
tiﬁcation for not approving for sale the products of GM varieties grown abroad.2
2 Indeed such a case might have arisen following China’s 2001 restriction on GM imports, had China
not eased the application of that policy to soybeans the following year in response to strong US objections.
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Since such non-tariﬀ barriers to trade would undermine previously negotiated
reductions in tariﬀ protection, they are a direct challenge to theWTO’s multilateral
agricultural trade liberalization process. This suggests a great deal is at stake, and
even some of the directions of the impacts on people’s welfare in various countries,
let alone their magnitude, cannot be determined without empirical analysis. For
example, developing country farmers could lose if they are not given access to this
new biotechnology, but would their export sales to the EU be boosted suﬃciently
by the reduced competition from GM-adopting countries to warrant choosing to
remain GM-free for the moment?
Economic analysts have responded to these uncertainties by using simulation
models of the global economy to provide empirical estimates of the eﬀects of GM
adoption by some countries and policy and consumer reactions in other countries
Table 1. Sources of the European Union’s non-EU imports of maize, soybean and
canola, by volume, 1995 to 2001 (%)
1995–97 1999–2001




United States 64 2 65
Argentina 18 72 13
Brazil 0 11 3
Hungary 17 9 2
Rest of world 1 6 17
TOTAL 100 100 100
Soybean
United States 60 42 54
Argentina 9 4 9
Brazil 24 47 27
Rest of world 4 5 10
TOTAL 100 100 100
Soybean meal
United States 6 2 19
Argentina 36 50 40
Brazil 56 46 29
Rest of world 2 1 12
TOTAL 100 100 100
Canola (rapeseed)
Canada 54 0 59
Australia 0 22 24
Central Europe 39 70 12
Rest of world 7 8 5
TOTAL 100 100 100
Source : www.aﬀa.gov.au/gmmarkets based on EU oﬃcial trade data.
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(e.g., Nielsen and Anderson, 2001; Nielsen, Robinson, and Theirfelder, 2003; van
Meijl and van Tongeren, 2004). This paper seeks to go beyond those initial studies
by addressing ﬁrstly the political economy question of why countries are choosing
such diﬀerent (and apparently sub-optimal) GM policies, and secondly the ques-
tion of how policy choices to date have impacted not just on national economies in
aggregate but also on the poorest groups within developing countries, namely
farmers and unskilled non-farm labourers.
Section 1 outlines a number of alternative or additional possible explanations
for key GM policy choices to date. Some of those hypotheses can be subjected to
empirical scrutiny using a simulation model of the global economy, which at the
same time can provide empirical estimates of the distributional eﬀects between and
within countries of GM production, consumption, and import policies. We make
use of Version 5.4 of the GTAP data and model of the global economy, modiﬁed as
described in Section 2, to generate the results presented in Section 3 on the esti-
mated economic eﬀects of recent and alternative GM technology and policy
choices. Section 4 then returns to the political economy question on potential
drivers of the policy choices countries have made. The ﬁnal two sections draw out
implications of the ﬁndings for poverty alleviation in developing countries and for
the global trading system.
1. Why such different GM policies?
Given the attributes described above of the new GM food technology, one might
expect the optimal initial policy response would be to test for both the environ-
mental eﬀects of producing GM varieties and the safety of consuming them. If
concerns remained about cross-pollination with native species, producers could be
required to leave buﬀer zones between GM crops and nature belts ; and, if no food
safety issues were identiﬁed but some consumers still preferred to avoid GM food,
the government could establish certiﬁcation guidelines for voluntary labelling of
non-GM varieties, for example.
To date there appears to be little evidence to justify the concerns reﬂected in
the precautionary stance taken by all but three GM-adopting countries. On
the consumer/food safety side, the worries have been that GM-derived food
may be more toxic or carcinogenic, result in more allergies, or be nutritionally
less adequate than GM-free food; and that transgenes might survive digestion
and alter the genome of the person or animal consuming them. But a recent UK
government report by eminent scientists that reviewed available evidence found no
adverse eﬀects anywhere in the world. So like previous similar reports it concluded
that, on balance, ‘the risks to human health are very low for GM crops currently
on the market ’ (King, 2003: 23). Nor could the King committee ﬁnd any theor-
etical reason or empirical evidence to suggest that GM crops would be any more
invasive or persistent, or toxic to soil or wildlife outside the farmed environment
than conventional crop varieties, or spread their genes to other plants.
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Several reasons for the EU’s strict policy stance have been suggested. One is
simply that the government wishes to appease the anti-GM protesters, but they are
noisy on both sides of the Atlantic so that is unlikely to be a major explanation for
the policy diﬀerence. Another possible explanation is that the government is giving
EU biotech ﬁrms time to catch up with American competitors so that intellectual
property rights are paid to domestic rather than foreign patent holders. That
hypothesis is diﬃcult to test immediately, but could be examined if/when the EU
and others do begin to approve GM varieties. A third possible explanation is that
the farm lobby beneﬁts from the stance taken by the government of each country/
region even if the regional economy as a whole loses. That hypothesis is empiri-
cally testable in principle, although some practical considerations should be borne
in mind. For example, if buﬀer zoning were to be required to reduce the risk that
GM crops cross-pollinate with native grasses, such regulations would be more
costly (and hence more discouraging of adoption) in closely settled, densely
populated environments such as in Western Europe and Northeast Asia than
in broad-acre settings such as North and South America and Australia. Also, if
domestic GM production diminished the country’s proﬁts from non-GM food
sales (for example through tarnishing its generic reputation as a supplier of safe
food), farmers may consider the amortised cost of that outweighs the expected
beneﬁt from the new technology, bearing in mind any costs associated with
co-existence requirements, and taking into account any price diﬀerence between
GM- and non-GM varieties. Even where there is a net gain to farmers as a group,
those within that group wishing to remain non-GM producers may lobby to keep
it GM free so as to avoid new identity preservation and contamination-avoidance
costs, higher land rents, and perhaps lower product prices because of erosion of
generic reputation as a safe food supplier.
For many developing countries not needing to segregate crop varieties for
domestic sales, the costs of identity preservation and contamination avoidance in
order to export may be prohibitive, giving rise to what Baldwin (2001) described
as a two-tier world under technical barriers of trade: if they wanted to continue
exporting food to the EU, they had no choice but to ban GM food production
while the EU moratorium was in eﬀect. On the other hand, for wealthier countries
willing and able to pay the premium required for a segregation/identity preser-
vation system, labelling may be optimal. But, even they will ﬁnd the EU’s labelling
regulations, which came into eﬀect from 1 May 2004, draconian. The number of
categories of products subject to testing in the EU is enormous, and the threshold
levels of tolerance of accidental GMO contamination are very low. Moreover,
feedstuﬀs also are now included in the EU’s list and must be labelled, even though
GM protein or DNA will not be present in the livestock products of feedlot
operators using feed ingredients based on GM crops.
As a ﬁrst step towards shedding light on this issue, it is helpful to be aware of the
world market shares of the key players in grain and oilseed markets. In 1998–2002
the US shares in global production have been 40% for maize and 43% for
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soybean, and its shares in global exports (including intra-EU trade) are 66 and
51%, respectively. By contrast the EU produced only 6% of the world’s maize and
only 1% of the soybean. The other big players in these two markets are China,
Brazil, and Argentina. China accounts for roughly one-ﬁfth of global production
and consumption (and one-tenth of global exports) of maize, and for one-tenth,
one-third, and one-ﬁfth of global production, consumption, and imports of soy-
bean, respectively. Brazil and Argentina are smaller players in the maize market
(6 and 3% of global production, respectively, although Argentina accounts for
one-eighth of global maize exports), but they are both signiﬁcant in the soybean
market: together they account for 37% of global production, 29% of global
consumption, and38%of exports. Canada togetherwith the EUandChina account
for three-quarters of global canola production, and Australia another 5%. The EU
trades canola a lot among its members but is almost self-suﬃcient, so when intra-
EU exports are excluded then Canada and Australia account for more than 80%
of residual world trade in canola. The three big exporters of GM maize, soybean,
and canola also account for one-third of global beef exports and more than 40%
of global exports of pig and poultry meat. This contrasts with the other key cereals,
wheat and rice, which are far less concentrated among the GM adopters. China
and India add counterweight to wheat production and consumption; and China
and India account for half of global rice production and consumption and, with
Thailand and Vietnam, for two-thirds of global rice exports. Hence, there will be
somewhat diﬀerent distributional eﬀects from the introduction of GM varieties for
those products than for the feedgrain–oilseed–livestock complex, with much
stronger consequences for developing country farmers and consumers. Because of
maize import restrictions and considerable domestic production of feed barley, the
EU accounted for less than 4% of global imports of maize. Soybean imports have
been less restricted, however (because of the EU’s long-standing GATT binding of
a zero tariﬀ on soybean), as have canola imports. The EU accounts for more than
one-third of global imports of both soybean and canola (Anderson and Jackson,
2005a: Tables 3 and 4).
US farmers clearly have a strong interest in a low degree of GMO regulation
of production, so that they can exploit the new technology before it is dissemi-
nated beyond the US. They also have a strong interest in a low degree of GMO
consumer regulation both at home and in their export markets, given that
they supply more than half of global exports (including intra-EU trade). Over
the past decade, feedgrains and oilseeds (mostly maize and soybean) accounted
for 18% of the gross value of agricultural output in the US, and the livestock sector
that uses those products as inputs accounted for another 44%.
The interests of EU farmers, on the other hand, are less clear-cut. While they
could beneﬁt directly from more-productive technologies, other things equal, the
ﬁrst-available GM food crops (maize and soybean) are of minor direct importance
to them. Also, GM technology would be less proﬁtable in the densely settled
European landscape, where non-GM crops and nature areas are much closer and
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so there would need to be more buﬀer zoning per hectare of GM crop there than in
broad-acre landscapes such as in the US. For many small farmers the potential
productivity gains may be more than oﬀset by the management costs of buﬀer
zoning, so there would be a greater proportion of EU than US farmers wanting to
continue to produce just non-GM crops. That proportion would be even higher the
greater the opposition by environmental and consumer groups to the selling of GM
foods in Europe (where most EU-produced crop output is sold, in contrast to the
US where more than one-quarter is exported to other regions) – and even more so
now that tough labelling laws and low unintentional GM tolerance levels have
been legislated, since that requires producers to put a high-cost segregation and
identity preservation system in place if and when GM varieties are approved in
the EU.
Another important inﬂuence on EU farmer interests is the extent to which their
crop products are internationally competitive. Given that North America and
Argentina have already adopted GM technology, EU food producers – despite not
adopting GM varieties – may be more competitive in their own and in third-
country markets vis-a`-vis the GM adopters if consumers in those markets are
suﬃciently GM averse, and more so the tougher are consumer policies towards
GM foods. If those tough standards were to apply to feed ingredients as well (as is
now the case in the EU), then EU livestock producers also could support anti-GM
policies since they too are unlikely to beneﬁt as much from the GM technology as
the more maize-and-soybean-intensive North American livestock producers.
These possibilities will change over time of course, and, if consumer and en-
vironmental concerns subside in the years ahead, one can imagine a time when GM
food technology becomes the norm everywhere, not just in parts of the Americas.
But that time may still be a long way oﬀ. Brooks and Barfoot (2003), for example,
expect less than 10% of a few crops at most being under GM varieties in the EU
by 2013.
Given the above, under what circumstances over the medium term might it be
conceivable that EU farmers are better oﬀ by denying themselves access to GM
technology, and how would current GM-adopting farmers and players in other
countries fare in those various circumstances? This question can only be addressed
using an empirical model of the world’s food markets, to which we turn after ﬁrst
describing that model and using it to estimate the production, trade, and aggregate
national economic welfare eﬀects of GM food technology adoption without and
with government and consumer reactions.
2. The GTAP model modifications and scenarios
We use a well-received empirical model of the global economy (the GTAP model)
to examine the eﬀects of some countries adopting the new GMO technology
without and then with government and consumer responses in other countries.
Being a general equilibrium model, GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project)
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describes both the vertical and horizontal linkages between all product markets
both within the model’s individual countries and regions as well as between
countries and regions via their bilateral trade ﬂows. The Version 5.4 database used
for these applications draws on the global economic structures and trade ﬂows of
1997, around the time of the take-oﬀ in adoption of GM crop varieties and just
prior to the EU imposing its de facto moratorium. To make the results easier to
digest, the GTAP model has been aggregated to depict the global economy as
having 16 regions (to highlight the main participants in the GMO debate), and 14
sectors (with the focus on the primary agricultural sectors aﬀected by the GMO
debate and their related processing industries).3
The scenarios analysed here assume that GM-driven productivity growth has
occurred only in a subset of countries and only for a few of the GTAP sectors.
Speciﬁcally, coarse grain (primarily maize in the countries considered) and oilseeds
(primarily soybean and canola in the countries considered) are included in all
scenarios, but to illustrate what might happen soon we also look at adoption of
GM rice and wheat in some countries.
The following scenarios are based on a simplifying assumption, namely, that the
eﬀect of adopting GM crops can be captured by a Hicks-neutral technology shift,
i.e. a uniform reduction in all primary factors and intermediate inputs to obtain the
same level of production. For present purposes the GM-adopting sectors are
assumed to experience a one-oﬀ increase in total factor productivity, thus rightward
shifting the supply curve for the GM crop to that extent.4 Demanders of primary
agricultural products such as maize and soybean meal for livestock feed will
beneﬁt from lower input prices, which in turn will aﬀect the market competitive-
ness of grain-fed versus grass-fed livestock producers.
The widespread adoption of GM varieties in some parts of the world will aﬀect
other regions via international trade ﬂows. To the extent that trade is not further
restricted and not currently subject to binding quantitative restrictions, world
market prices for these products will tend to decline and thus beneﬁt regions that
are net importers of these products. For exporters, the lower price may or may
3 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is a multi-regional, static, applied general equi-
librium model, based on neo-classical microeconomic theory with international trade described by an
Armington (1969) speciﬁcation (which means that products are diﬀerentiated by country of origin). See
Hertel (1997) for comprehensive model documentation and Dimaranan and McDougall (2002) for the
GTAP 5.4 database used here. The model is solved with GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson,
1996).
4 Due to the absence of suﬃciently detailed empirical data on the agronomic and hence economic
impact of cultivating GM crops, the productivity shock applied here represents an average shock (over all
speciﬁed commodities and regions). Changing this shock (e.g. doubling it) generates near-linear changes
(i.e. roughly a doubling) in the eﬀects on prices and quantities. This lowering of the supply price of GM
crops is net of the technology fee paid to the seed supplier (which is assumed to be a payment for past sunk
costs of research) and of any mandatory ‘may contain GMOs’ labeling and identity preservation costs.
The former are ignored in the computable general equilibrium analysis to follow, but further research
might explicitly include them and, to ﬁne-tune the welfare calculations, even keep track of which country
is the home of the (typically multinational) ﬁrm receiving the technology fee.
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not mean their trade in value terms goes down, depending on price elasticities in
foreign markets. Welfare among exporting countries would decrease for non-
adopters but could also decrease for some GM-adopting countries if the adverse
terms of trade change were to be suﬃciently strong. Hence the need for empirical
analysis, particularly when the countries in focus are large global players in some
of the markets aﬀected.
We have modiﬁed the GTAP model so it can capture the eﬀects of productivity
increases of GM crops, some consumer aversion to products containing GMOs,
and substitutability between GM and non-GM products as intermediate inputs
into ﬁnal consumable food. There are ﬁve types of productive factors in the version
used here: skilled labour, unskilled labour, agricultural land, other natural re-
sources, and other (non-human) capital. All factors except natural resources (used
only in primary production) are assumed to be perfectly mobile throughout the
economy.
Production
Depending upon the simulation, the Unites States and Canada are assumed to be
the major adopters of GM crops. Not all other countries are assumed to adopt GM
crops in every scenario but, in simulations where we explore what would happen if
they did adopt, we assume they would do so to a lesser extent than the ﬁrst
GM-adopting countries. None of these countries is as intensive in the use of maize,
soybean, and canola as the ﬁrst GM adopters, and few have the same degree of
broad-acre agriculture. Hence they are more likely to be constrained by govern-
ment in how they plant GM varieties. In addition, unlike the ﬁrst GM-adopters,
some may have segregation and identity preservation costs imposed on them,
which further reduces the proﬁtability for them of GM adoption.
In these GTAP simulations we assume 45% of US and Canadian coarse grain
production is GM. When they adopt, all Latin American countries and Australia
are assumed to adopt GM coarse grains at two-thirds the level of the US (i.e., 30%
of coarse grain production is GM), while all other countries are assumed to adopt
GM coarse grains at one-third the level of US adoption (i.e., 15% of coarse grain
production is GM). For oilseeds, we assume that 75% of oilseed production in the
US, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil is GM. Again Other Latin American countries
and Australia are assumed to adopt at two-thirds the extent of the major adopters
and the remaining regions adopt at one-third the extent of the major adopters. For
the rice scenarios, major adopters, including the US, Canada, China, India, and all
other Asian countries are assumed to produce 45% of their crop using GM tech-
nologies. All other regions adopt at two-thirds this rate (i.e., 30% of rice crop is
GM). GM wheat adoption is assumed to occur at the same extent as coarse grain
adoption for all regions.
The adopting sectors are each sub-divided into GM and non-GM varieties, and
an output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral productivity shock is implemented on the
GM varieties of these commodities to capture their higher productivity. This
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assumes that GM technology uniformly reduces the level of primary factors and
intermediate inputs needed per unit of output.5 When a region does not adopt GM
technologies, no regional factor productivity shock is included and there is no
distinction between GM and non-GM production in these regions. In the constant-
elasticity-of-substitution production nest, producers choose ﬁrst between imported
and domestic inputs according to the model’s Armington (1969) elasticities, and
then choose whether or not to use GM or non-GM intermediate inputs in their
production of ﬁnal goods.
Consumption
In order to capture consumer aversion to GM products, two changes are made to
the traditional GTAP demand structure. First, elasticities of substitution between
GM and non-GM products in the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand
where consumers are GM-averse are set at low levels to capture the perceived low
substitutability of these products. (Sensitivity of the results to those assumed
elasticity values are reported below.) In addition, preference shift parameters
are included to capture the group of consumers in some countries that, because
of food safety and/or environmental concerns, refuses to consume GM crops
regardless of their price. In such cases a 25% reduction in ﬁnal demand for
output of crops that may contain GMOs is assumed, following Nielsen and
Anderson (2001).
Factor ownership
GTAP provides a comprehensive decomposition of changes in national economic
welfare as measured by the equivalent variation in income. National and world
measures of welfare changes hide the distributional implications within countries
of GM policies, however, and so fail to provide insights into the political economy
of GM policy choices. While the total economic beneﬁts from trade typically
decrease when ineﬃcient policies such as import bans are implemented, some
groups within national economies will be beneﬁciaries. Hence post-simulation
analysis is desirable.
We examine the eﬀects on intra-regional distribution of income by dividing the
economy into three groups of households: farmers, unskilled labourers, and
owners of human and other capital. Income of each group comes from a combi-
nation of factors. Farm households earn income from farm and non-farm activi-
ties. The existing GTAP database provides information about the availability and
use of land, unskilled labour, skilled labour, other natural resources and other
capital in the agricultural sector, and likewise in other sectors. Non-farm activities
5 Because it makes little diﬀerence to the results being analysed here, we simply follow previous ana-
lysts in assuming that the productivity eﬀects of genetic modiﬁcation do not diﬀer across crops or inputs
(Nielsen and Anderson, 2001; Anderson, Nielsen, and Robinson, 2002). For studies that diﬀerentiate the
degrees of factor/input saving, see Huang et al. (2004) and van Meijl and van Tongeren (2004).
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of farm households are assumed to earn income from factors in the same pro-
portion as activities conducted by the typical urban capital-owning household.
Hence factor shares for farm households are a weighted sum of factor shares used
in agricultural production and the factor income shares of capital owners.6 The
shares of farm household income from non-farm activities are assumed to be 90%
in Japan and Korea, 50% in China and the EU, 35% in US and Canada,7 25% in
Australia, New Zealand, and Eastern Europe, and 20% in all Latin American
countries, India, South and South-east Asia, South African Customs Union, and
the Rest of the World. The remaining Sub-Saharan African countries are
assumed to gain 10% of their farm household income from non-farm activities.
Unskilled labourers are assumed to receive all their income from unskilled
non-farm labour. The expenditure shares are assumed to be the same for all
households, so real household incomes are calculated simply by deﬂating by the
consumer price index.
Simulations
Several sets of simulations are considered below to address the questions posed in
the introduction. We begin with GM adoption for just coarse grains and oilseeds
but then add rice and wheat, to get a feel for the relative economic importance to
diﬀerent regions and the world as a whole of current versus prospective GM food
crop technologies. We look at the impacts of GM adoption by just the US, Canada,
and Argentina ﬁrst, without and then with some policy reactions in other coun-
tries. Then we add the EU to the list of adopters to explore the tradeoﬀs for the
EU between productivity growth via GM adoption and the beneﬁts of remaining
GM-free given the prior move to adopt in the Americas. Following Stone et al.
(2002), these model simulations assume that total factor productivity is higher for
GM than for non-GM varieties by 6% for oilseeds and 7.5% for coarse grains; in
the later cases of rice and wheat, a modest 5% productivity diﬀerence is assumed
so as to provide a conservative estimate of its impact.8
6 This measure of impact on farmer income is diﬀerent from the partial equilibrium measure of
producer surplus used by, for example, Lindner and Jarrett (1978) who show that even with a completely
inelastic demand curve a parallel shift (but not a pivotal shift) downwards in the supply curve will not
reduce producer surplus. The measure of farm household income change used here can generate a loss for
producers partly because it is a general equilibrium measure that also captures oﬀ-farm earnings of farm
households, but also because the technology shock only applies to the GM varieties which then have to
compete with the (sometimes preferred) non-GM varieties of that crop. Hence the price-depressing impact
can more than oﬀset the eﬀect of the productivity improvement on proﬁts of GM adopters.
7 This is the average for commercial farmers. In the US, commercial farmers are only one-third of the
total number of farmers. Another one-quarter of them are considered simply rural residents. If the
remaining two-ﬁfths, known as ‘intermediates’, are included in the deﬁnition, then the share of farm
household income earned from non-farm sources rises to 75% (USDA, 2001). Sensitivity analysis of the
post-simulation results is therefore reported below to show what diﬀerence the deﬁnition makes to the US
results.
8 In this paper we ignore the GM variety known as ‘golden rice’, which aims not to boost farm
productivity but rather to boost the health of rice consumers through enhancing it with pro-vitamin A
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The base case is compared with several alternative scenarios. One involves an
EU moratorium on GM imports from Argentina, the US, and Canada, where it is
assumed there is no segregation between GM and non-GM products and therefore
the EU import ban (modelled as a prohibitive tariﬀ) is imposed on all coarse grains
and oilseeds from those three GM adopters. Another scenario assumes the EU,
Japan, and Korea implement labelling policies that allow consumers to choose
between non-GM products and those that may contain GM content. In this
option, diehard consumers in the EU, Korea, and Japan avoid consuming coarse
grains and oilseeds. (This is modelled as a 25% reduction in ﬁnal consumption of
coarse grains and oilseeds in those countries.) A third alternative scenario is that
the EU abandons its stand against GM products in favour of the American stance,
while all other countries remain non-adopters. And a ﬁnal scenario assumes that
such a change of heart in the EU would induce the rest of the world to adopt GM
varieties of coarse grains and oilseeds as well.
All those scenarios ignore the fact that GM technology also could apply to other
crops, so we also examine the welfare and distributional eﬀects of adding GM rice
and wheat. Were GM varieties of those commodities to be adopted, it is likely that
China and possibly India would be part of the adopting group, so they are included
in the latter simulations.
3. Model results9
In the absence of any adverse reactions abroad, the GM-adopting countries ex-
pand their output and net exports of coarse grains and oilseeds (and meat), while
the opposite happens in the rest of the world. Consumption of these products
expands in all regions because they are now cheaper, but especially in the GM-
adopting regions, since in this model the Armington assumption ensures that im-
ported products are an imperfect substitute for domestically produced products.10
However, when the EU moratorium is imposed on imports from GM-adopting
countries, the international prices of coarse grains and oilseeds fall more – so much
so as to cause GM-adopting countries to reduce their output of these crops slightly.
In Europe, the opposite occurs because the import ban drives up domestic prices
(Anderson and Jackson, 2005a: Table 10).
If instead the EU were to also adopt GM varieties, EU production and net
exports are higher instead of lower, increases in production and exports by the ﬁrst
GM-adopters are slightly less, and decreases in production and net exports by the
(Beyer et al., 2002). For an economic analysis of its possible beneﬁts as compared with those from GM rice
that simply boosts farm productivity, see Anderson, Jackson, and Nielsen (2005).
9 This section draws on Anderson and Jackson (2005c).
10 The price falls are less than in Nielsen and Anderson (2001) because the present study distinguishes
GM from non-GM varieties and applies the productivity shocks only to the former, whereas the earlier
study applied it to all production in GM-adopting countries.
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rest of the world are slightly more because international prices of coarse grains and
oilseeds fall more (see Anderson and Jackson, 2005a: Table 11).
A comparison of the welfare eﬀects of this second scenario and those from the
EU moratorium provides a conservative estimate of the cost of the EU’s recent
policy compared with following the North American strategy of embracing GM
technology, but only if the EU stance has no eﬀect on other countries’ GM policies.
In so far as the rest of the world is delaying adoption solely because of the EU
stance, on the other hand, then an upper-bound estimate of the cost of the EU’s
policy can be found by comparing a scenario in which all countries adopt GM
varieties of coarse grains and oilseeds with the EU moratorium case (which eﬀec-
tively has applied even in the 12 months since its replacement with strict labelling
regulations, because of the slow pace of the approval process).
The aggregate economic welfare eﬀects of these various cases are summarized in
Table 2 for all scenarios. Several points can be drawn from that table, the ﬁrst
being that the global beneﬁts of the ﬁrst group’s GM adoption is substantial
(US$2.3 billion per year) if there are no adverse reactions elsewhere, and about
one-quarter of it is shared with the major importing regions of the EU and
Northeast Asia; but Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa lose very slightly.
Second, when the EU imposes its moratorium, this is similar to an increase in
farm protection there and causes the EU to be worse oﬀ by $3.1 billion per year
(less whatever value EU consumers place on having avoided consuming GM pro-
ducts), as well as reducing by one-third the gain to GM-adopting North America,
while improving welfare for Brazil considerably but for food-importing regions of
the rest of the world only very slightly.
Third, if instead the EU left it for individual EU consumers to respond and one-
quarter of them simply avoided these products because they may contain GMOs,
the welfare eﬀects are almost the same as in the base case, because even though
there is less EU consumption there is also less protected production in high-cost
Europe and so less wastage of resources there.
Fourth, if the EU were to take the opposite view and allow GM adoption,
it would gain more because of its own productivity gains and so too would
net importers of these products elsewhere in the world, while net exporters of
coarse grains and oilseeds (both GM adopters and non-adopters) would be slightly
worse oﬀ. Hence the net global gains would be just 7% more than in the base
case because coarse grains and oilseeds are minor crops in the EU compared with
North America – assuming the EU moratorium has no impact on the GM policies
of other countries.
However, if by adopting that opposite stance in the EU the rest of the world
became uninhibited about adopting GM varieties of these crops, global welfare
would be increased by nearly twice as much as it would when just North America
and Argentina adopt, the EU too would gain more in this scenario as compared
with just the EU alone joining the GM adopters because of improved terms of
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trade, and almost all of the extra global gains would be enjoyed by developing
countries (ﬁnal column of Table 2).
The cost of the EU’s policy stance can be thought of as in the range of the
diﬀerence between columns 4 and 2 and the diﬀerence between columns 2 and 5 of
Table 2, depending on how much one believes the EU’s stance is determining the
rest of the world’s reluctance to adopt GM varieties of these crops. For the EU that
cost range is (406+3,145=) $3,551 million to (595+3,145=) $3,740 million per
year, while for the world as a whole the range is 2.43+1.24=) $3.67 billion to
(4.05+1.24=) $5.29 billion per year. But even that $5.3 billion number under-
states the global welfare cost of the EU’s policy in at least three respects. First,
we have not included in the second scenario in Table 2 (the EU moratorium) the
fact that the EU’s stance has already induced some other countries to also impose
similar moratoria. Second, these are comparative static simulations that ignore
that fact that GM food R&D is on-going and that investment in this area has been
reduced considerably because of the EU’s extreme policy stance. And, third, the
above results refer to GM adoption just of coarse grains and oilseeds. The world’s
other two major food crops are rice and wheat, for which GM varieties have been
developed and are close to being ready for release. How much impact might they
have, should governments choose to approve them?
Table 2. Economic welfare eﬀects of GM coarse grain and oilseed adoption by
various regions (equivalent variation in income, US$ million)











EU adopt All adopt
United States 939 628 936 928 897
Canada 72 7 67 70 65
Argentina 312 247 310 307 287
Brazil x36 256 x46 x53 317
Other Latin America 125 184 130 128 356
Australia x9 x4 x10 x10 2
New Zealand x5 2 x5 x5 x6
EU-15 267 x3,145 326 406 595
Eastern Europe 7 x10 9 8 35
China 107 111 113 110 235
India 0 3 1 0 252
Japan+Korea 322 341 178 335 430
Other Asia 36 44 39 37 134
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 21 2 2 69
Rest of World 152 75 169 167 380
WORLD 2,290 x1,243 2,219 2,429 4,047
Source : Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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If rice and wheat were to be approved in the current GM-adopting countries
they also would be likely to be adopted in China and India. This is because those
two large developing countries account for 55% of the world’s rice market and
30% of the wheat market and are close to self suﬃcient in both. That means they
do not have to worry as much about EU market access. We re-ran the simulations
allowing China and India to join the GM-adopters group, and added to coarse
grains and oilseeds both rice and wheat.
The eﬀects on aggregate economic welfare, and it distribution, of adding these
two extra countries and commodities are dramatic (even though we ignore the
potential health beneﬁts from the GM variety known as ‘golden rice’). The global
economic welfare gain if there is no policy response by the EU or others is $3.9
billion with just rice added or $4.3 billion if wheat is also added, instead of $2.3
billion per year (compare column 1 of Tables 2 and 4). North America gains only a
little more from the addition of GM rice and wheat, which might seem surprising
given the importance to it of wheat, but it is because its productivity gain is almost
oﬀset by a worsening of its terms of trade as a consequence of their and the other
adopters’ additional productivity. Two-thirds of the extra $2.0 billion per year
from adding rice and wheat accrues to China and India, with other developing
countries, as a net importing group, enjoying most of the residual via lower-priced
imports.
What about this case if the EU moratorium were still in place? A comparison of
the diﬀerences between columns 1 and 2 in Tables 2 and 4 reveals an increase in
the cost to the EU of its strict policy, from $3.4 to $5.1 billion per year (again not
counting the beneﬁt to EU consumers of knowing they are not consuming GMOs),
while for the rest of the world the diﬀerence is small. But again a more appropriate
comparison if the EU policy is discouraging GM adoption elsewhere is between the
EU moratorium case and the case where all countries including the EU adopt,
shown in the ﬁnal column of Table 3. That diﬀerence is $5.5 billion for the EU and
$8.4 billion for the world as a whole. Those numbers compare with $3.7 and $5.3
billion, respectively, in the earlier situation that excluded rice and wheat – an
increase of 1.6 times the estimated global cost of the EU’s policy. And the adding
of further crops to the GM family would continue to multiply that estimate.
As with all CGE modelling results, the above are subject to qualiﬁcations,
perhaps the most important being the way consumer preferences are handled.
The estimated market and welfare eﬀects vary with the elasticities of substitution
assumed between GM and non-GM varieties of a product, as detailed in Anderson,
Nielsen, and Robinson (2002). To reduce the risk of exaggerating the eﬀects we
chose very low elasticities for Europe and Northeast Asia and moderate ones
elsewhere. Even so, we have no satisfactory way of valuing any loss of welfare for
consumers who would like to avoid consuming foods containing GMOs but
cannot if they are introduced into their marketplace without credible labelling. We
have assumed that loss to be zero in all but the third scenario reported in Table 2
(where we arbitrarily assumed a one-quarter reduction in EU ﬁnal demand for
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coarse grains and oilseeds because in that scenario those products may contain
imported GM varieties). One additional way to cope with this issue is to introduce
a cost of segregation and identity preservation. We did that implicitly by choosing
conservative cost savings due to the new technology, saying they were net of any
fees charged for segregation and identity preservation. According to Burton et al.
(2002) such fees may be as high as 15% of farm gate price, which would make it
unproﬁtable to market many GM varieties if that was a required condition of sale.
Others suggest those costs could be miniscule on the grounds that such segregation
is increasingly being demanded by consumers of many conventional foods anyway
(e.g., diﬀerent grades or varieties of each crop) so the marginal cost of expanding
such systems to handle GM-ness would not be great, at least in countries willing to
pay for product diﬀerentiation.
4. What impact do the results have on farm household incomes?
How have the policy responses by the EU and followers impacted on farmers in
high-income countries and – from a poverty alleviation perspective – on farmers
and unskilled non-farm labourers in developing countries? The eﬀects on real farm
household incomes, summarized in Table 4, show Argentinean farmers are slightly
Table 3. Economic welfare eﬀects of GM adoption by the US, Canada,
Argentina plus China, and India (equivalent variation in income, US$ million)
NA, ARG, CHN, IND adopt
coarse grains, oilseeds and
rice and wheat
All countries incl. EU
adopt coarse grains,
oilseeds, and rice and wheat
Without policy response With EU moratorium Without policy response
US 1,045 754 1,041
Canada 83 x23 64
Argentina 350 285 312
Brazil x37 284 430
Other Latin America 155 236 453
Australia x18 x10 x1
New Zealand x6 2 x7
EU-15 355 x4,717 810
Eastern Europe 10 x15 54
China 841 833 899
India 669 654 669
Japan+Korea 494 521 1,198
Other Asia 70 92 701
Sub-Saharan Africa 12 38 202
Rest of World 284 173 682
WORLD 4,308 x892 7,506
Source : Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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better oﬀ and farmers in the US and Canada are only slightly worse oﬀ as a result
of their adoption of GM varieties. Even though the productivity gains are more
than oﬀset by the price declines for North American farmers (since they are such a
dominant part of the global market for maize and soybean), if any one sub-group
of them did not adopt they would be even worse oﬀ by suﬀering the price decline
but not enjoying the productivity growth. Note from columns 2 and 3 of Table 4
that their welfare has been worsened greatly by the EU moratorium, but only a
small amount by the EU allowing consumers to vote with their Euros. Farmers in
the EU, on the other hand, while only slightly worse oﬀ if there is GM adoption in
the Americas, are made better oﬀ if the EU moratorium on American imports is
imposed. However, that advantage disappears if either EU consumers are allowed
to choose for themselves or if EU farmers are allowed to adopt these GM varieties
(in which case the price decline evidently fully oﬀsets the productivity gain for
them – see columns 1 to 4 of row 8 of Table 4). In short, American farmers are
made worse oﬀ,11 and EU farmers better oﬀ, by the EU ban on production and
imports of products that may contain GMOs, compared with the alternatives of
embracing the new technology as in America or even just allowing EU consumers
the right to choose. Even if farmers are not playing a major role in determining
GM policies in these regions, the results suggest they would not be unhappy with
current policies.
The right-hand half of Table 4 refers to GM adoption also of rice and wheat,
with China and India joining the GM adopters. This would depress international
grain prices even more but the gain to Argentinean farmers from higher wheat
productivity would more than compensate, while North American farmers would
be slightly worse oﬀ than if GM approval remains restricted to coarse grains and
oilseeds. Farmers in China and India in this case would gain, and those gains to
Chinese and Indian farm households would be only slightly diminished by the EU
moratorium (since they export very little food to the EU).
Since there are also large national economic welfare gains from adoption for
China (Table 3), how can these results be reconciled with China’s decision each
year to delay approving GM food production and its move to ban imports of GM
products in 2001 (subsequently weakened in 2002 but only after strong protests
from the US)? China’s policy is all the more puzzling given that China (a) has the
technology and could release numerous GM crop varieties including rice almost
immediately (Huang and Wang, 2002; Huang et al., 2004), (b) exports very few
food products and then mostly to East Asia and so is not likely to suﬀer serious
problems of market access, particularly in the years ahead, as industrialization
causes China’s export competitiveness in land-intensive crops to diminish, and
11 As part of our sensitivity analysis, we recalculated the ﬁrst row of Table 5 assuming the share of
farm household income in the US earned oﬀ the farm was 0.75 instead of 0.35 (to allow for smaller farms,
even though they typically would not be very inﬂuential in lobbying). Even though the magnitude of all the
eﬀects on real US farmer incomes was reduced (by about 60%), the signs remained the same.
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Table 4. Percentage change in farm household real income in selected regions, various GM adoption and policy response
scenarios
GM coarse grains and oilseeds
GM coarse grains, oilseeds, rice, and wheat

































United States x0.18 x0.36 x0.20 x0.19 x0.20 x0.43 x0.51 x0.29
Canada x0.26 x0.57 x0.28 x0.27 x0.29 x0.63 x0.769 x0.36
Argentina 0.01 x0.10 0.00 0.00 0.07 x0.15 x0.16 x0.07
Brazil x0.00 0.15 x0.01 x0.02 x0.01 0.12 x0.15 x0.03
Other Latin America x0.06 x0.06 x0.07 x0.07 x0.07 x0.06 x0.17 x0.14
Australia x0.04 x0.03 x0.04 x0.04 x0.07 x0.04 x0.19 x0.17
New Zealand x0.03 0.00 x0.03 x0.03 x0.02 0.00 x0.05 x0.18
EU-15 x0.03 0.74 x0.05 x0.05 x0.04 0.86 1.69 x0.07
Eastern Europe x0.03 0.08 x0.03 x0.03 x0.03 0.11 x0.05 x0.08
China x0.02 x0.02 x0.03 x0.02 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12
India 0.00 0.00 x0.03 x0.03 0.01 x0.02 x0.03 x0.01
Japan+Korea x0.01 x0.01 x0.01 x0.01 0.00 x0.02 0.09 0.00
Other Asia x0.04 x0.03 x0.04 x0.04 x0.03 x0.02 x0.09 x0.04
South Africa x0.03 0.02 x0.04 x0.04 x0.03 0.03 x0.03 x0.07
Rest of Sub–Saharan Africa x0.01 0.04 x0.01 x0.01 x0.01 0.04 0.11 0.01
Rest of World x0.04 0.03 x0.04 x0.04 x0.04 0.03 x0.02 x0.09
























(c) as a poor country would gain from GM adoption of those crops about 20 times
as much as North America when the gain is expressed as a share of GDP (and India
would gain nearly 40 times as much). Oﬃcially the reason is that food safety tests
are still under way, but an alternative or additional possibility is that China is
stalling until it has its own GM varieties ready for release so as to avoid paying
foreign ﬁrms for intellectual property rights.12
5. Implications for poverty alleviation in developing countries
Our results show that the EU moratorium has beneﬁted food-importing develop-
ing countries (and Japan and Korea), because of an improvement in their terms of
trade. However, the above analysis does not take into account that moratoria will
slow the investment in agricultural biotechnology, and so reduce future market
and technological spillovers to developing countries from that prospective R&D.
Furthermore, future generations of GM products are likely to provide health and
nutritional beneﬁts to consumers, as in GM rice enhanced with pro-vitamin A
(Beyer et al., 2002). The costs of delaying investments in those GM technologies
will fall heavily on the world’s poor consumers (Anderson, Jackson, and Nielsen,
2005). More importantly from the viewpoint of poverty reduction in poor
countries, unskilled non-farm labourers – who have gained little from the current
limited adoption of GM food varieties – would gain much more as adoption
spreads (Table 5).
If the reason for China’s reluctance to approve GM varieties for domestic pro-
duction is because it wants to restrict approval to indigenously developed GM
varieties so as to capture the intellectual property earnings domestically, then one
can only hope – for the sake of their consumers and farmers – that such varieties
will be ready soon (and that India and subsequent potential GM adopters will be
willing to use Chinese or other GM varieties rather than cause further delays, while
their biotech researchers catch up).
And what about Sub-Saharan Africa, where almost one-third of the world’s
people living on less than $1 a day reside (up from one-tenth two decades ago)? It
might be thought that, given their strong trade ties with the EU, SSA countries
would beneﬁt more from less competition in EU markets for GM-free food than
12 What about Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), which have chosen so far not to approve GM food
production? ANZ would lose slightly less in net economic welfare terms from joining with all others in
adopting GM varieties of these four crops (Table 3), but the diﬀerence is less than $1 per capita per year.
Even if that was suﬃcient to oﬀset the negative value ANZ consumers place on not knowing if they may be
consuming GM products, rows 6 and 7 of Table 4 shows the average ANZ farm household income would
not improve from GM adoption by it and others – even with rice and wheat included – regardless of
whether the EU moratorium remains. Hence one should not expect ANZ farmers to be pushing hard for
rapid approval of GM production until consumer concerns fade. Nor are there any huge ANZ-owned
biotech ﬁrms developing the technology and hence lobbying for its adoption in those relatively small
markets in the same way as there are in the US. For more on the impacts on ANZ, see Anderson and
Jackson (2004, 2005a).
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they would gain from adopting GM varieties. However, a new set of GTAP
simulations suggests the opposite would be far more likely: farm productivity gains
in SSA would swamp the gains through improved terms of trade as a result of the
EU ban on imports from GM-adopting countries (Anderson and Jackson, 2005c).
6. Implications for the global trading system
As discussed in more detail elsewhere (Anderson and Nielsen 2001a,b), these
ﬁndings have worrying implications for the WTO rules-based global trading
system. If it is in the interests of farmers in food-importing countries of Europe
and elsewhere to forego adopting this new biotechnology in order to reduce their
competitive disadvantage vis a`-vis more-eﬃcient export-oriented producers in
America and elsewhere, then those protected producers have no incentive to
oppose consumer and environmental groups’ lobbying for tough GMO standards –
and it may not even be in the interests of Cairns Group farmers in Australia and
New Zealand to oppose that stance (Anderson and Jackson, 2004, 2005a). Such
standards could provide a replacement for the traditional forms of government
assistance to agriculture that are under pressure to be dismantled in agricultural-
protectionist countries, following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Not
only would that negate the beneﬁts of negotiating lower farm support programs in
the current Doha round of WTO negotiations, but it promises to raise the level of
friction in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.
The complex nature of the genetic modiﬁcations required to produce GM pro-
ducts that has lead to diverse national regulatory approaches for GM products has
created conditions in which spontaneous policy convergence is unlikely. The way
these regulatory goals are achieved depends on, among other things, existing
national regulatory structure, the agricultural production systems, and consumer
perception of these products. Attaining harmonized policy outcomes depends on
the interaction among national policies and existing international policy frame-
works.
Many WTO Agreements encourage governments to harmonize regulatory
policies, for example by referencing standards from international organizations, so
as to reduce unnecessary trade distortions and reduce the potential for conﬂict.
However, WTO Members do not always agree on the way WTO Agreements
should be interpreted in the contexts of the diverse characteristics of GM products
(particularly their potential food safety and environmental impacts) and divergent
regulatory goals. Individual regulations in the food and animal and plant health
area may be written so that they have multiple purposes, not all of which are
covered by a single Agreement. Some parts of the regulations may have goals that
relate to measures under the SPS Agreement, while other parts may fall under the
TBT or other Agreements.
The SPS Agreement covers all measures whose purpose is to protect human or
animal health from food-borne risks, human health from animal- or plant-carried
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Table 5. Percentage change in real incomes of unskilled non-farm labourers in developing countries, various GM adoption
and policy response scenarios
NA and ARG adopt GM coarse
grain and oilseeds NA, ARG, CHN and IND adopt GM















adopt GM coarse grain,
oilseed, rice & wheat
Unskilled non-farm labourers
Argentina 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08
Brazil 0.03 x0.03 0.03 0.03 x0.07 0.07
Other Latin America x0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
China x0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.20
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.32 0.33
Other South and SE Asia x0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.19
South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05



























diseases, and animal and plants from pests or diseases. For a trade-distorting
measure to be acceptable under SPS, there would have to be a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation
on food, plant, or animal safety grounds. This scientiﬁc justiﬁcation is linked to the
obligation to perform a risk assessment related to the purpose of the measure or to
base the measure on international standards. In cases where the scientiﬁc infor-
mation is insuﬃcient, WTO Members have the right to implement provisional
measures. However, these rights are linked to obligations to seek to obtain
additional information in order to conduct a more objective risk assessment and
to review the SPS measures within a reasonable period of time.
If the intent of the measure is not related to the protection of human, animal, or
plant health, then the measure does not fall under the SPS Agreement but it could
be covered by the TBT agreement. While under the SPS Agreement Members are
required to justify measures scientiﬁcally, under the TBT Agreement governments
may opt to deviate from international standards for non-scientiﬁc reasons,
including technological problems or geographical factors. Previous disputes
concerning the TBT Agreement have considered the issue of whether regulations
make unjustiﬁed distinctions between like products. This question is complicated in
the context of GM products which, by deﬁnition, have been altered genetically but
which may not diﬀer in characteristics that can be perceived by consumers. Under
the TBT Agreement governments also have the right to implement regulations with
the aim to protect consumers through the provision of information. That is
manifest mainly in the form of labelling requirements, but it is still unclear whether
a labelling regulation justiﬁed only by the consumer’s ‘right to know’ about all
types of characteristics of products in the market would be covered by the TBT
Agreement. Yet the consumer’s ‘right to know’ argument often plays a signiﬁcant
role in debates on GM policies in countries with groups of consumers who believe
their national government should be able to exercise the right to provide them
information.
If a government has justiﬁed GMO mandatory labelling policies based on en-
vironmental health or food safety grounds, and the SPS Agreement was found to
apply, then the SPS Agreement encourages Members to harmonize their policies
with international standards, particularly those created by the Codex
Alimentarius, the OIE and the IPPC. However, even in this context, guidance for
harmonization of GM policies is not clear. The Codex Alimentarius provides
guidance in several areas relation to the evaluation of GM food products, includ-
ing: ‘Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern
Biotechnology’, ‘Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods
Derived from Recombinant-DNA Plants ’, and ‘Guideline for the Conduct of Food
Safety Assessment of Foods Produced Using Recombiant-DNA Microorganisms’.
Guidance on the evaluation of environmental risks associated with biotechnology
products is less developed. The IPPC provides guidance on systemic issues for
evaluating risks associated with ‘Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests including
analysis of environmental risks and living modiﬁed organisms’. For this guideline
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to apply to GM products, the GM product would need to satisfy the deﬁnition of
pest. Given the many diﬀerent types of GM products and the varied perception of
these products, the designation of ‘pest ’ is not inevitable and therefore neither is
the application of this guideline in the analysis of risk. Since there is no inter-
nationally accepted approach from among the myriad of options regarding the
evaluation of environmental risks associated with GMOs, harmonization towards
a single analytical approach is unlikely.
Scientiﬁc uncertainty, such as the uncertainty surrounding the long-term
environmental impacts of cultivating GM crop varieties, creates further obstacles
to harmonization because there are currently two international Agreements in this
area. On the one hand, the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, which seeks to pro-
vide a framework for dealing with environmental uncertainties posed by living
modiﬁed organisms, explicitly incorporates the precautionary approach but does
not provide criteria by which countries can be judged to be abusing the right to
implement a precautionary policy. On the other hand, the SPS Agreement, as
mentioned above, includes text which allows governments to take regulatory
action in the face of scientiﬁc uncertainty – but it also disciplines this right with
speciﬁc obligations to seek additional information and to update their measures as
the science evolves. The fact that these two international agreements both cover
trade in GM products does not necessarily mean that they imply incompatible
obligations. However, the extent to which their obligations converge depends on
how governments choose to implement the obligations described in these
Agreements. Thus the existence of these two Agreements creates an additional
layer of policy complexity and does not provide signiﬁcant incentives for policy
harmonization.
What can be done to address these tensions regarding GM products in the in-
ternational trading system? Perdikas, Kerr, and Hobbs (2001) suggest that a new
WTO agreement might be developed to accommodate consumer or social ‘right to
know’ interests. It is not obvious, however, that better outcomes would result,
particularly since this type of agreement would not adequately discipline the
incentive for governments to implement trade-distorting measures for purely
protectionist reasons. What type of objective criteria could be used in this situation
to discriminate between justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed measures?
Sheldon and Josling (2002) raise the possibility that importing countries who
wish to persist with mandatory labelling or import bans that are deemed WTO-
inconsistent oﬀer increases in market access for non-GM foods in compensation
for loss of market access for foods that may contain GMOs. While this proposal
has the virtue that the WTO would then not be dragged into evaluating social and
ethical bases for regulations, it may encourage countries to continue protectionist
measures for a wider range of politically sensitive industries.
The variety of possible interpretations of international agreements in this
area evidently provides countries scope for implementing vastly divergent GM
policies. The tension between national sovereignty and international rules in the
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case of GM products is unlikely to be solved by spontaneous policy harmoni-
zation among trading partners. In the absence of incentives to seek harmonized
positions, countries will continue to respond to their own internal political
economy. But perhaps the process of dispute settlement in the WTO, regardless
of whether it leads to rulings and recommendations by the Dispute Settlement
Body, will provide a catalyst for countries to seek mutually agreeable solutions to
GM conﬂicts.
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